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Tanner Skym
29 October 2020
Bolshevik Germany: America’s Perception to Bolshevism and the Origins of the German
Revolution
In 1917, Vladimir Lenin and his concepts known as Bolshevism emerged in Russia and
deposed of the Russian provisional government. Bolshevism’s intentions included to shift power
from the elites to the working class and provoke worker revolutions around the world;
eventually, this Marxist revolutionary concept evolved into communism and transformed Russia
into the Soviet Union. After conquering Russia, the Bolshevik ideology voyaged throughout
various European countries; it inspired working class to collaborate and overthrow their
government. While the Allied Powers had minor complications with the issue of Bolshevism
during the World War I era, the losing Central Powers were vulnerable to receive this
contamination as countries, including Germany, reconsidered their régime. Bolshevik influence
scattered across the German nation and was a crucial component to the initial stages of the 19181919 German Revolution.
As these European nations wrestled with both the war and Bolshevism, Americans
observed the conflict and this new ideology, concerned about the future ideals of democracy in
Europe. With the escalation of Bolshevism, American journalists anticipated various European
countries to plunge into an anarchic state. The American newspapers reported any incidences
involving Bolshevism; Literary Digest mentioned that there were rumors of the red flag in
various European cities, becoming “the symbol of a political system” that was “not merely in
contrast with our own, but in definite antagonism to it.” The observers asserted that numerous

Bolshevik meetings occurred “with an attendance of more than ten thousand” and criticized this
new system of “economic and political tyranny.”1 Because of their frequent coverage on
Bolshevism in Europe and the assumption it could take control of European governments, the
American press deliberately initiated the premature stages of the “Red Scare” throughout
American society.
When Germany transitioned into a revolution in the fall of 1918, American journalists
claimed that Germans lost morale and blamed the monarchial government for losing the war.
These American reporters anticipated that Bolsheviks planned to fan the flames for the uprising,
convincing German workers to collaborate and remove their government in exchange for a
Socialist-like state. Journalist William English Wallings in The Daily Missourian prophesied a
revolution in Germany. He mentioned that Russian Bolsheviks were convinced that the Germans
will surely follow their example,” expecting them to overthrow Kaiser Wilhelm. He added that
Germans acknowledged numerous conflicts within their state; in conclusion, Wallings insisted
that Germany “may begin to move towards revolution” with the support of Lenin and his
Russian revolutionists. 2 This message from Wallings distributed throughout additional
newspapers in various states, revealing an intensification in American belief that Germany was
on a similar direction as the Russian Bolsheviks. Over a year later, in their article on October 9th,
1918, The Washington Times assessed “rumbling” from “the streets of Berlin;” the journalist
foreshadowed an uprising among the German civilians:
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When the Kaiser’s part is done, when his killing is ended, when all the volumes of
his murders are complete, another volume will be added, and that will be THE
GERMAN REVOLUTION.
The article incessantly discussed Germany’s path towards revolution as the theory came
“from every corner… from every family that has been put in mourning, from every miserable
creature crippled and starved;” they claimed that the suffering from the people “satisfied the
Kaiser’s insane vanity.” An interesting component in this article included the reporter’s
declaration that the German’s aggressive state “will not stop;” they compared this disquiet
situation to the similar outcome in Russia “that overtook the Russian Tzar.” 3 The media
coverage insisted that it was part of the Bolshevik’s plot. The Washington Times speculated that
the Bolsheviks prepared to “overtake the Kaiser;” the new press believed nothing could
counteract this Bolshevism infection.4 A few weeks prior to the events of the German
Revolution, The Seattle Star contended that a “red” revolution was going to develop in Germany;
they declared a Bolshevist revolution has erupted among the German crowds.5
The articles collected in this paper uncover the early stages of the Red Scare in America
prior to 1919. From these assessments, we can understand this anxiety over Bolshevism that
extended throughout civilians and news reporters throughout the United States. This panic
commenced due to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and intensified as American newspapers
convinced the American public that European countries were on the verge of collapsing to this
unfamiliar socialist concept. Because of rumors that Lenin transpired from Germany with his
Bolshevik ideology, American journalists monitored Germany and their road to revolution. The
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purpose of this paper is to analyze these various American newspaper assumptions of the rise of
Bolshevism in Germany.
I.

The Rise of Bolshevism and the Response from German Socialism

The influence of Bolshevism from Russia to Germany became laborious due to the
competition with the ideology of German socialism, an ideology that emerged in Germany from
the inspiration of French socialism in the mid-nineteenth century. Scholar Carlton J. H. Hayes
stated that the mindset of the German Social Democrats by the end of World War I “conditioned
quite rationally” from developments that unraveled from the “evolution of German socialism
since 1848.” Hayes discusses the early stages of German socialism deriving from Karl Marx and
Max Engels publication of the Communist Manifesto; he states that this “birth-cry of modern
Socialism” became “well calculated to affright divine-right monarchs and to terrify all
respectable well-to-do bourgeois” by urging the working class from all countries to unite against
their monarchial governments. Although the ideology of German socialism emerged in 1848,
Hayes stressed that Germany was “more unripe for a Socialist revolution” in comparison to
interests for a democratic or national revolution. 6 Yet the ideas of Marxist socialism persevered
in Germany throughout the nineteenth century; it influenced various leaders including social
reformer Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of the “Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeitverein” or
General Labor Union of Germany in 1863. Lassalle’s party, despite several warring factions,
eventually transitioned into the Social Democratic Party of Germany (S.P.D); the ideology of
German social democracy preserved candidates and votes throughout the late nineteenth century,
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even with the anti-Socialist laws enforced by Otto von Bismarck from 1875 to 1890.7 Around the
beginning of World War I, due to mixed feelings on the war, the party separated once more, and
the Independent German Socialist Party (U.S.P.D) emerged, consisting of the “minority
socialists.” Hayes pointed out that this group endorsed the German government “so long as the
war was obviously defensive against Russia,” but opposed it when they perceived the war to be
“waged primarily against England and France.”8 The introduction of Bolshevism from Russia in
the late 1910s provoked more differences between both the S.P.D. and the U.S.P.D.
The reaction to the March Revolution of 1917 and the succession of a Russian
provisional government in place of the monarchy varied among the divided German socialists.
According to scholar John L. Snell, the March Revolution’s “immediate effect… was to
accentuate the differences that already existed between the prowar and antiwar factions” within
the S.P.D. and the U.S.P.D. A small group within the U.S.P.D., the extremely radical Spartacus
League established by Dr. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, declared this revolution to be
“a signal for proletarian revolution in Germany;” in their first statement on the March
Revolution, the Spartacists believed it was “not the end, but only a weak beginning” for their
objective to overthrow German elites.9 The remaining U.S.P.D. envisioned the March Revolution
differently; they pointed out that it was symbolic to “the desire for peace in Russia” and the
objective consisted of “peace without annexations.” Additionally, the U.S.P.D. pushed for an
alteration to the Imperial Government’s policies instead of destroying the system.10 As for the
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S.P.D., they welcomed the Russian Revolution; however, they were skeptical of the Russian
example and refused to endorse it for Germany.11 When the November Revolution of 1917
occurred, Lenin and the Bolsheviks triumphed and established full control of the Russian
government. Once he was successful in establishing his version of peace in Russia, Lenin would
spread Bolshevism into other European countries in an effort to fulfill “peaceful” obligations
When Bolshevism infected Germany, mixed feelings emerged within the German society.
The German elites and monarchial government opposed their objectives; Scholar Ralph Haswell
Lutz addressed that Bolshevism agitated “both the German government and the German masses
of the nation.” He noted that Lenin attempted to win over the German working class to achieve
his aspirations for revolutionary socialism throughout Europe.12 These Bolsheviks insisted that
their methods were the most beneficial to the German working class, their intentions to defend
Germany “with the obligations of an international social democracy.”13 Bolsheviks aimed to
distributed followers in Germany; Lutz disclosed that once Germans had made peace with
Russians in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, many German prisoners who were “trained as proselytes
of Bolshevism” returned to Germany and began a “Bolshevist agitation;” this agony these
prisoners obtained from the Bolsheviks “undermined the discipline of the Germany army,”
which Lutz argued that these actions were “one of the fundamental causes of the revolution.”14
Due to the rise of Bolshevism within the German society, Germany plunged into a divided
predicament, steering them to the road of a revolution.
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In addition to this diverse response from the German people, the S.P.D, the U.S.P.D, and
the Spartacists debated on the ideology of Bolshevism. According to The German Revolution
and After by historian Heinrich Ströbel, the theories between the Bolsheviks and the S.P.D were
“quite incompatible” with each other. The explanation for this incompatibility consisted of the
Bolsheviks focus to transfer “the methods of Russian Bolshevism” into the German socialists;
although they wanted peace, the Bolsheviks urged for revolutionary socialism.15 Yet Lutz
claimed minority socialists became “profoundly influenced by the success of the Bolsheviki;”
they acknowledged Lenin and his denouncement of democratic programs. Minority socialist
leaders, including Dr. Karl Liebknecht, maintained this belief that Bolshevism was “a
remarkable political and social system” as these new Marxist theories adapted into their concept
of Socialism.16
To earn influence from German communities, Bolsheviks distributed literature,
discussing their objectives. The readings of Lenin, Leon Trotzky and Karl Radek scattered
throughout German cities; according to Lutz, the German working masses interpreted
Bolshevism “as a fundamental cause of the German revolution, and perhaps its final goal.”17 The
working class was not the only group instigated by Bolshevism to revolt as elitists reconsidered
the concepts to avoid the influence of from the Allied countries. Historian Stephen Miles Bouton
analyzes some German reactions to this Bolshevik propaganda. He points out in And the Kaiser
Abdicates a Berlin millionaire’s optimistic remark on the influence of Bolshevism:
If it comes to a question of choosing between Bolshevism and Allied slavery, I
shall become a Bolshevik without hesitation. I would rather see Germany in the
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possession of Bolshevist Germans than of any bourgeois government wearing chains
imposed by our enemies. The Allies dare not intervene in Russia, and I do not [sic]
believe they would be any less helpless before a Bolshevist Germany.18
Bolshevik views carried across Germany as the Socialist Party accepted many of the
notions that involved overthrowing the government. Although German elites refused the
Socialist concepts, they would rather accept this ideology than abide with a bourgeois
government. Bouton conveys that the effect of the Bolsheviks appeared in various German cities.
He mentions how Bolshevik centers emerged within these cities and the response of German
police to shut down these nests, an effort to prevent this Bolshevik propaganda from spreading to
other cities.19 The Bolsheviks aimed their attention toward imperialistic Germany, according to
Bouton, as these activist “entered Germany by secret routes,” working alongside Germans to
assist in their cause.20
The Bolshevik spreading influence in the German Socialist Parties and the German
society contributed to the cause of the German Revolution. Members of the S.P.D, U.S.P.D, and
the Spartacists considered the ideology of revolutionary socialism after they noticed its successes
in the November Revolution. In a further attempt to convince the German society to revolt, the
readings of Lenin, Trotsky, and Radek circulated among German communities; German
prisoners from Russia would also spread the ideology. While German elites disagreed with
Bolshevik ideology, they had no choice but to join the cause of the revolution in an attempt to
prevent being controlled by the Allied Powers after the war. Bolshevism assisted in promoting
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the German working class to revolt and “murder the oppressors” to “overthrow the
government.”21
II.

America’s response to the Bolshevik Uprising in Russia

The concept of Bolshevism and their leaders received negative responses from
Americans. Scholar Christopher Lasch quoted an excerpt from the St. Louis Post Dispatch that
“Bolshevik platform has many appealing doctrines,” yet leaders were “so intemperate and
visionary” and refuse to give in to the ideals of Bolshevism. He explained that various American
newspapers viewed the Bolsheviks as a “power for evil,” declaring that “their ineptitude” and
“their unreasoning impatience” would not persevere in the American society.22 At first the
ideology of democracy protected Americans from believing that Bolshevism would overcome
their society. Yet the surge of Bolshevism had Americans doubt their self-assurance.
American journalists produced various rumors that Bolshevik leaders were actually spies
that were sent from Germany to crush Russia’s provisional government, specifically Lenin.
Lasch believed that “if [Lenin] was depicted as a German agent, he was the unwitting tool, not
the accomplice, of the Kaiser.”23 These rumors spread in various presses; El Paso Herald
claimed that Lenin returned from exile to Russia with the assistance and funding from
Germany.24 The Butte Daily Post assumed that Lenin’s purpose was establishing a propaganda
“in favor of early peace with Germany.”25 Daily East Oregonian pointed out that the collapse of
Russia to Lenin and Trotsky would provide Germany “a source of strength.”26 Webster City
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Freeman argued that Lenin was “a German sympathizer;” they pointed out that Lenin knew “a
triumphant Germany” would fulfill Russian ambitions in becoming “a free and independent
state.”27 The declaration from the various articles in American newspapers that Lenin was a
German agent foreshadowed the principles that Bolshevism’s origins drifted from Germany.
The March Revolution in Russia generated mixed reactions from Americans. According
to Leonid I. Strakovsky in American Opinion About Russia, 1917-1920, the abdication of the
Russian Tsar and the Provisional Government at first enthralled Americans, believing that “ a
broadly democratic platform” could replace the monarchy with “an avowed aim of prosecuting
the war to a victorious end.28 Some articles, including one from the Daily Star Mirror considered
the function of this rebellion planned to suppress this “rule of all Pro-German officials;”
journalists hinted the possibility that Tsar Nicholas was in collaboration with the Germans and
hindered “Russia’s progress in the great war.”29 American journalists were very enthusiastic
about the arrival of the “New Russia;” in an article from the New York Times, the U.S. was the
first nation that actually recognized this new Government. The U.S. ambassador at the time,
David R. Francis, shared the news of the United States encountering this new government; he
anticipated that the U.S and Russia could continue their “cordial relations” that proved to be
“mutually satisfactory and beneficial.” The Russian Foreign Minister, Paul Milukoff, elatedly
responded, believing this “great change” within the new Russian government “will do much to
bring the U.S. and Russia [sic] closer together.” In addition to this comment, Milukoff stated that
Russia was “proud to be recognized first by a country whose ideals they [sic] cherish.”30 At first,
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the American society imagined Russia would become a democracy under Premier Alexander
Kerensky. Yet American civilians did not expect socialist parties, including Lenin and his
Bolsheviks, to continue internal conflicts in the Russian government.
Eventually, Americans discovered the split between the provisional government and the
introduction of various socialist parties, which had progressively challenged “the authority of the
Russian Provisional Government.”31 Few American newspapers anticipated another upheaval
against this democratic government; Oklahoma City Times acknowledged Kerensky as a dictator
of Russia, that a new sinister force threatened to wreck this “New Russia.” The journalist
claimed that in response Kerensky granted “unlimited powers” to his provisional government to
potentially remove these “enemies of public order.” Yet fear developed as counter-revolution
established by Lenin, Russian workers, and soldiers continued to dispute these procedures from
the Russian government, directing them into a horrendous state of anarchy. A telegram in the
Oklahoma City Times article hoped that Russia could “find enough courage to strike those who
by their cowardice” are destroying their progress toward a democracy.32 The socialist
insurrection against Russia’s new democratic government engendered panic in the American
press and the American society.
While newspapers accredited Lenin as “pro-German” and a “radical socialist leader” the
Evening Star informed the public that the Russian government planned to seize him along with
his followers. The article anticipated that he would be killed or isolated since he worked “in the
interest of Germany.” The journalist commented on the provisional government being “anxious
to avoid any accusations of interference with freedom of speech” and they claimed that Lenin’s
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activities were “more dangerous for Russia and her liberty than the German armies;”
furthermore, the government declared that he was “mentally unbalanced.”33 Newspapers were
certain of Russia’s decline; they claimed that Lenin damaged the success of the new provisional
government with his attempts to revolt. The Ogden Standard assessed Lenin’s radicalism and his
attempts “to attain political independence” by generating “strikes, agrarian disorders and antigovernment demonstrations” throughout Russia. They also noted that Kerensky’s promise to
“save Russia and Russian unity” was not sufficient as the government continued to experience
anarchial difficulties34 Some newspaper presses continued to advocate for a democracy in
Russia; the Glas Svobode in Chicago, Illinois stated that it was “self-evident and clear” that this
new organization of Russia “cannot be anything else but a Democratic Republican.” They
furthered their declaration by pleading to the American government to support the Russian
provisional government since they extended their “helping hand to the Russian nation.” 35
American newspaper press encouraged the assistance of the American government in thwarting
Lenin and his Bolsheviks.
Unfortunately, the Bolsheviks prevailed against Kerensky and the provisional
government on November 7th, 1917. The news of Kerensky’s removal established a strong
perception of anxiety among the American press. The Detroit Times reconsidered that Russia
was “back again where she was last March,” and that these Bolsheviks were “extreme radicals
who burn at once to make the world a brotherhood,” that journalist insisted they were “set
against all wars. Yet they presumed that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were involved in this German
conspiracy. They pointed out that this “crazy scheme of restoring peace” was essentially part of
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this strategy for Germans to access Petrograd.36 Despite this theory, various American
newsletters maintained assurance that the Bolshevik regime would instantly dissolve, based on
the belief that democracy would defeat this socialist party. Evening Journal pointed out that the
government in Washington D.C claimed the socialist rebellion “would be ‘short-lived’” and that
the Bolsheviks could not endure the Russian army who was retrieved by Kerensky. The article
furthered this statement by insisting that Kerensky planned to give enough power “to hang
themselves” and that he “and the loyal army will be able to sweep aside the revolting
elements.”37 From these articles, the American press carried a sense of denial that Bolshevism
would prevail in their democratic vision; they were confident that Kerensky and the Russian
army would conquer these new foes.
Although these journalists were persistent in refusing that Bolshevism would thwart
democracy, they accused Kerensky’s lack of leadership and bad decision-making for this failure
of reunifying Russia. United Press staff correspondent William G. Shepherd investigated the
issues in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, composing a four-part sequence located
in numerous newspapers around the world. In the first fragment, he elucidated that many Russian
civilians were terrified of this Bolsheviki uprising; he claimed that the Russian soldiers were
“lusting for blood.” Shepherd stressed that the results of this Bolshevik revolution and the
outcome in made Russia’s attempts for a democracy “plainer than ever.”38 His second part
attacked Kerensky; Shepherd claimed that the consequence of the revolution had Kerensky’s life
“hung by a cord” and that Kerensky’s mistakes included his failure to act and execute these
Bolshevik rebels. In addition to this statement, Shepherd pointed out that the uprising resulted in
“Washington Sees Hope for Russia; Cossacks to Secede” Detroit Times, November 9th, 1917.
“Bolsheviki Government Crumbles, Moscow Garrison with Kerensky Loyalists March Against Lenine” The
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38
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the murder of many Russian civilians in the street; he sardonically acknowledged that these
horrendous deaths were “a fine instance of Kerensky’s bravery.” He claimed that Kerensky
abscond from the city as Lenin’s men incessantly massacred helpless victims and returned to the
city due to the threat of being arrested.39 In his third section, Shepherd criticized Kerensky’s
failure to restore capital punishment by allowing these “blood-shedding radicals, Lenin and
Trotsky” to go free; Shepherd furthered this argument by claiming that Kerensky “released every
Bolsheviki prisoner.” Since Kerensky failed to imprison the Bolsheviks, Shepherd stressed that
this disappointment “forced Kerensky to his downfall.”40 In the concluding segment of his story,
Shepherd observed Kerensky’s failure to provide for Russian civilians. As these Russian citizens
suffered from lack of attention and leadership by Kerensky, Shepherd argued that they “were
willing to agree to any change of government,” even “a Bolsheviki government” as an attempt to
acquire “food and clothes and fuel for the winter.” He criticized that Kerensky’s principles as
leader failed to “secure for the Russians [sic] the necessities of life,” and that he was overthrown
because the Bolsheviks promised “bread and peace” which influence their submission to
Bolshevism.41 More American journalists were displeased with Kerensky’s response to protect
the Russians from falling into the hands of Bolshevism. New York Times reminisced when they
believed that Russia became part of “the circles of democracies;” they dubbed those times as
joyous memories and claimed they faded “as darkness thickened” due to the Bolshevik
uprising.42In the Chicago Daily Tribune, journalists extended sympathy to the Russians as they
felt the civilians were “victimized and deluded by a gang of fanatical usurpers.”43 This discourse

William G. Shepherd, “Inside Facts on Russia,” The Daily Star-Mirror, December 6th, 1917.
William G. Shepherd, “Inside Facts on Russia,” The Daily Star-Mirror, December 7th, 1917.
41
William G. Shepherd, “Inside Facts on Russia,” The Daily Star-Mirror, December 8th, 1917.
42
Harold Williams, “Russia In Throes of Huge Upheaval,” New York Times, December 7th, 1917.
43
“Sympathy For Russia” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 27th, 1917.
39
40

from William Shepherd and other news articles demonstrates Russia’s failure to become a
democratic nation; because of Kerensky’s errors to accommodate the Russian civilians, he
fortuitously led Russia to the Bolsheviks.
While the American newspapers commiserated for the citizens, journalists continue to
argue that Bolsheviks were part of Germany’s plot to remove Russia from the war front.
Journalists continued to observe the new Bolshevik Russia and questioned if Germany would
join the Bolsheviks. Newspapers continued to debate on whether or not Germany would
succumb to a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks. Some journalists claimed that the Kaiser refused
to sign an armistice, while German socialists pushed for an agreement. In The Richmond
Palladium, they mentioned how the Independent Socialists of Germany insisted for the
Reichstag to “take up considerations of the new state of affairs,” since the Bolsheviks offered
land from Poland, Lithuania, and Gourland in their peace offer.44 When rumors that Kaiser
Wilhelm refused to cooperate with Lenin, the Independent Socialists responded with riots on the
streets, according to The Washington Herald. The journalist in this article claimed that German
socialists “embraced the cause of the Leninites” and mentioned how socialist leaders Philipp
Scheidemann and Frederich Ebert initiated “a nation-wide campaign” to force the German
government to sign the peace offer from the Russian Bolsheviks.45 According to The Oklahoma
City Times, the reasoning behind Kaiser Wilhelm’s refusal was the statement that he did not
recognize Lenin as the official leader; Wilhelm stated that he would only interact “with the legal
successor to the imperial government.”46
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Despite Wilhelm’s assertion of the Russian Bolshevik government and refusal to sign,
American journalists assured that Bolsheviks would not respect this rejection and instead focus
their peace objectives with the German working class. An article from The Fargo Forum and
Daily Republican examined a press conference with Bolshevik foreign minister Leon Trotsky. In
this meeting, Trotsky discussed the Bolshevik government’s initiatives; he stated that Russia’s
plan for peace would be “supported by the proletariat of all countries, allied or belligerent,”
relying on the German army and working class to side with the Bolshevik’s cause. Trotsky
stressed that if peace with Germany met with “no response,” then Russia would declare war
“against German imperialism.” Yet Trotsky believed that the offer from the Bolsheviks to the
German working classes “will make impossible a continuation” of this war.47 American
journalists continued to assume that Germany and Bolshevik Russia would arrange a treaty; this
assumption from the Americans also allowed them to consider that Germany was on the course
to Bolshevism as German socialists supported Lenin and exhorted the Kaiser for diplomatic
negotiations.
III.

The Road to German Revolution

The effect of Bolshevism affected both the home front and the war front. Historian Scott
Stephenson argued that direct contact with Bolshevism influenced “the conditions of combat in
the West in 1918” and that it persuaded both Allied and Central troopers as wartime
circumstances discouraged both sides. 48 He proclaimed that soldiers called ex-prisoners from
Russia Bolsheviki since their experiences in the Russian camps changed them into becoming
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more hostile to other soldiers believing they converted to Bolshevism Stephenson quoted an
excerpt from the 87th Infantry Division, stating that many of these “prisoners of war” that were
sent back from Russia were more dangerous to the army than “an increase in strength” from the
enemy.49 Even Bolshevism would travel throughout the battlefield and change soldiers.
Stephenson’s theory that Bolsheviks invaded the German army were mentioned
throughout American newspapers as well. The Daily Ardmoreite described how Bolsheviks
circulated in the German lines and spread their message around to soldiers with pamphlets. In the
brochure, they mentioned that the democratic peace promised by Germany was “unconscionable
lies” and argued that they were slaves to the government.50 Pierre Weekly Free Press stated that
these Bolsheviks “put Russian national affairs into the advisory hands of German stiff officers”
and were effectively capable to “discourage and defeat opposition to [the Kaiser’s] aims.”51
These insights from these American journalists theorized that Germany and the Bolsheviks were
in the process of establishing an alliance. This theory implemented Americans’ belief that
Bolshevism was slowly influencing German society,
In the spring of 1918, American officials speculated that Bolsheviks secretly supplied the
German army. Merlyn Leffler clarified that Bolsheviks appealed “to the war-wearied masses of
Europe” and their outcry for “peace without annexations and indemnities” worried many
American officials. The Bolsheviks’ attempt for peace with Germany was an endeavor to
provoke German civilians “to overthrow their government;” Leffler noted that these challenges
persuaded Woodrow Wilson to generate “his own vision of a peaceful world order” that
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contradicted the Russian Bolshevik’s efforts for peaceful negotiations.52 In addition, he included
how repelled Wilson was to Lenin and his “willingness to sign a separate peace, trade with the
enemy and use German and Austrian prisoners of war;” although Wilson maintained assurance
that Bolshevism would fall, this alliance offered the impression to Americans that “Bolshevik
Russia was willing to cede land and sell critical raw materials and foodstuffs to the enemy.”53 By
supplying German soldiers, Bolsheviks successfully infiltrated the German army and expanded
their ideology to the troops.
American journalists sensed a revolution among Germans from Bolshevik influence
months prior to the German Revolution. In an article by the New York Tribune, an American
family that returned from Germany discussed with the media about a “shortage of food” among
the “civilian population of Germany” along with the soldiers; the family mentioned that among
the German society, discussion of revolution continued to flourish. One of the family members,
Miss Olga Wurzburg, described her conversations with the soldiers; she stated that they “freely
expressed their growing dissatisfaction” with war conditions. She clarified that unless conditions
improved for the German soldiers, a revolt was going to transpire as the people and the soldiers
were “very impatient… their morale generally deteriorating.” Wurzburg added that German
soldiers experienced terrible housing environments and consumed a “gruel and a weak kind of
soup;” they complained about low earnings while German officers had “the best food, lodging
and pay.” From these poor conditions, German soldiers contemplated “a revolution against their
masters.” Wurzburg stated that the German newspapers exaggerated the updates of the war as an
attempt to improve morale; in reality, the efforts of German newsletters were “gradually losing
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their effect” as civilians contemplated an uprising.54 As the country failed to better their
conditions, the Bolsheviks were supplying them with resources, hoping to encourage a
revolution.
Historians Mark Jones explained that “over the course of 1918 the German political
imagination had been increasingly gripped by the rise of Bolshevism and the threat it posed to
the territories of the former Russian empire.” He added that newspapers who corresponded in
Russia “further radicalized older German understandings of Eastern Europe as an uncivilized and
chaotic space;” this illustration along with “the presence of more than 1.4 million prisoners of
war from the former Russian Empire inside Germany” gave anxiety among the German
population “that a Bolshevist-style revolution could take place there.”55 This similar sense of
anxiety was also distributed throughout Americans as journalists hypothesized a GermanBolshevik alliance.
The discussion of a German-Bolshevik pact concerned many Americans throughout the
summer. In the El Paso Herald, an article exclaimed that the Bolsheviks were threatening to join
Germany if Anglo-Japanese intervention occurred in Russia. The government declared “if the
Japanese and English should occupy Russian territory the Soviet government would immediately
join Germany.”56 New York Tribune accused the Bolsheviks were “delivering Russia over to
her[Germany] more and more every day.”57 The Washington Times asserted that “the Bolsheviki
are in some kind of agreement with the Germans” and that Germans were helping Bolsheviks
“restore the Bolsheviki power in southern Russia” in return for wheat. The article then stated that
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“The Bolsheviki and German interests being the same, I see no reason why they should not pool
their interests.”58
In the weeks prior to the start of the German Revolution, rumors of the rise in German
Bolshevism increased. The Greeneville Daily Sun declared that a Bolshevist Revolution was
impending in Germany. The journalist reported signs of Bolshevism “located among the
industrial classes” and that these “regular socialists” illustrated a form of government that sought
to abdicate Kaiser Wilhelm and lead the government to an anarchy that consisted of
bolshevism.59 The Daily Gate City had a similar report, yet they explained that there was action
“to prevent a Bolshevist movement within the empire” from the German conservatives.60 Despite
this effort to hinder this supposed Bolshevik uprising, the American press maintained this
assumption to the American society. The hope that democracy would succeed in the former
monarchial Germany almost faded.
IV.

Was it a Bolshevik Revolution in Germany? Conclusion

On October 28th, 1918, German sailors and citizens rebelled against German elites in
Kiel; this rebellion began when the admiral of the Markgraf received a status report from the
high German naval offers, which “circulated among the crews” that a suicide mission would take
place as a last resort against a British fleet. The seamen and stokers, angered by this order,
opposed this method; this eventually led to an uprising that traveled to other German cities.
Historian Stephen Miles Bouton claimed that the stokers were the ones “who set rolling the stone
which became the avalanche of revolution” as they were driven “by bourgeois elements.”61
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American journalists assumed this rebellion was part of the Bolshevik uprising. The American
media coverage of this insurrection consisted of identifying anything that deemed the German
civilians to be part of the Bolsheviks. In an article by the Bossier Banner, the journalist stated the
sailors on the Kaiser battleship “hoisted the red flag.” 62 The Evening Missourian furthered this
assumption the following day, when the press mentioned that “revolting soldiers and sailors”
were capturing more German cities, including Hamburg; they too “waved red flags.”63 The West
Virginian’s report was similar to the previous article, yet they titled their piece as “Bolshevism in
German Navy.”64 Evening Public Ledger examined these strikes as well; they declared that
“‘Red’ troops have occupied all of the Kiel workshops” and that these “revolutionary troops at
Kiel are wearing red cockades and carrying flaming banners.” In addition, the reporter
mentioned the proclamation delivered by the revolutionary leaders:
Comrades: The present days will be remembered in the history of Germany. For
the first time political powers is in the hands of the solders. A great work lies before us,
but in order that its realization and organization be carried out it was necessary to form a
council of workmen and soldiers to be responsible for the preservation of order.”65
The word “comrades” made Americans assume that these mutineers were driven by
Bolshevism, since comrade was often termed to address fellow Bolsheviks. The decree also
focused upon this formation of workmen and soldiers to control order, which continued to
persuade Americans that this mutiny was a Bolshevik uprising. Stephenson explained that these
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soldiers were “modeled after the Bolshevik soviets” as they occupied “many of the cities of
northern Germany and the industrial centers of the Ruhr.”66
Because American journalists considered that the Kiel Mutiny derived influence from
Russian Bolsheviks, Americans believed that the German Revolution of 1918-1919 occurred due
to the assumption that Bolshevism proliferated throughout Germany. This early version of the
Red Scare against Germany emerged because Americans assumed that Lenin and his followers
originated from Germany, based off the reports from the March Revolution of 1917 to the
beginning of the German Revolution. The American society presumed that Bolshevism voyaged
from Germany to Russia, succeeded the Russian tzar, overthrew Alexander Kerensky and his
provisional government, then eventually returned to abdicate Kaiser Wilhelm and overthrow the
German government. It was because of the alleged reports and stories from various media
coverages that preemptively opened the early traces of the Red Scare in American society. These
purported statements were successful in spreading propaganda to the American society that
Bolshevism could destroy any possibilities of German democracy in the early twentieth century.
In a 1919 review from the New York Times, a journalist evaluated the rise of the
Bolshevism. They pointed out that despite the Russian Bolsheviks being “a minority group,”
they demonstrated extraordinary power in conquering Russia. They stated that with “the collapse
of the Central Powers,” Bolshevism could transpire into the remains of the German and AustroHungarian empires. In conclusion, the reporter pointed out that “the year 1918 will be
memorable for many things,” including the transformation “of this clown at whom the world
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laughed at” and how it changed into a “monster that has its aim on… the conquest of the
world.”67
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